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THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR A MISTRIAL AFTER THE PROSECUTOR 
USED A PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE TO STRIKE A 
HISPANIC VENIRE PERSON AND NOT REQUIRING 
THE PROSECUTOR TO EXPLAIN HIS ACTION, 
T
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specifically overruled the provisions of Swain v, Alabama/ 380 U.S. 
202 (1965) which required a showing of a systematic use of 
peremptory challenges to keep minorities off juries. 
The major contention raised in the Respondent's brief was 
that Batson should not be applied retroactively to this case. The 
Respondent also argued that the facts in this case did not support 
the conclusion that the venireperson in question, John Lopez, is 
Hispanic. Both of these contentions are without merit. 
After Respondent submitted his brief the United States 
Supreme Court issued an opinion dealing with the retroactive 
application of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. , 90 L.Ed. 2d 69 
(1986). In Griffith v. Kentucky, Case No. 85-5221, 40 Cr. L. 3169 
(January 14, 1987) the Supreme Court held that Batson applied 
retroactively to all cases, state or federal, pending on direct 
review. The instant case is on direct review to this Court and thus 
Batson is clearly applicable contrary to the State's assertion. 
Batson established a two-step process by which a defendant 
may establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination by a 
prosecutor in the use of his peremptory challenges* First, the 
defendant must show that he is a member of a cognizable racial group 
and that the prosecutor has used peremptory challenges to remove 
from the venire members of the defendant's race. A defendant may 
rely on the fact that peremptory challenges constitute a jury 
selection process that permits those to discriminate who are of a 
mind to discriminate. 90 L.Ed. 2d at 87. 
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poor jurors for blue collar crimes (Addendum D of Appellant's 
Brief). Finally, Mr. Lopez was in every other way qualified to sit 
on the jury. Mr. Lopez is L.D.S., studied accounting at LDS 
Business College, is married, has a steady job and lives within 
blocks of another juror who the prosecutor allowed to remain on the 
jury (T. 179, 194). 
All of this evidence taken together raises a clear 
inference that the only reason the prosecutor used a peremptory 
challenge to remove Mr. Lopez from the petit jury was the fact that 
Mr. Lopez is Hispanic. Respondent's reliance on Phillips v. State, 
496 N.E. 2d 87 (Ind. 1986) is misplaced. The court in Phillips, 
however, found a neutral explanation for the prosecutor's challenge 
to each juror that was readily apparent from the record. Each of 
the veniremen in Phillips were removed because they either indicated 
they were acquainted with potential witnesses or had relatives who 
had been convicted in the county. No such neutral explanation is 
apparent in the instant case. Mr. Lopez was in every way an 
acceptable juror. 
The Appellant in this case raised an inference that Mr. 
Lopez was removed by the prosecutor on account of race. The burden 
thus shifted to the prosecutor to come forward with a neutral 
explanation for the challenge as required in Batson. The prosecutor 
in this case refused to come forward with a netural explanation (T. 
201) and thus the Appellant's conviction should be reversed so that 
he can be tried before a jury that has been chosen free from any 
discrimination. 
_
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POINT II. 
(Reply to Respondent's Point II.) 
INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED BY THE STATE 
TO ESTABLISH GUILT BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT. 
In the Appellant's opening brief the Appellant argued that 
the evidence in this case was so "inherently improbable" that this 
Court should reverse his convictions. To support this argument the 
Appellant included in his opening brief Addenda A and F. Addendum F 
was a copy of State's Exhibits 22 and 24 which the victim had 
confused at trial. Addendum A was a transcript of the line-up that 
the victim had attended; the transcript was introduced as 
Defendant's Exhibit 28 to show what instructions the victim had 
received at the line-up. 
In its response brief, the State contends that the 
transcript of the line-up and state's exhibits 22 and 24 are not 
part of the record (Resp. Brief p.14). This contention is totally 
without merit. The transcript of the line-up was introduced into 
evidence at trial and was received as Defendant's Exhibit 28. 
Respondent also contends that Appellant is seeking a de novo review 
of evidence. Actually, what the Appellant seeks is a review of the 
evidence to determine if it was "inherently improbable." 
Rule 11(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
provides, "The original papers and exhibits filed in the district 
court, the transcript of proceedings, if any, and the index prepared 
by the clerk of the district court shall constitute the record on 
appeal in all cases." (Emphasis Added) In this case as all three 
items were admitted into evidence as exhibits, there can be no 
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question that they are a part of the record on appeal. Furthermore 
a staff member from the Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc, went to the 
clerk of this Court and found these items in the evidence envelope 
on file in this case. 
Appellant argues that the evidence introduced in this case 
was "inherently improbable." The applicable standard of review is 
that announced in State v. Petreey 659 P.2d 442 (Utah 1983), which 
gives this Court the right to review a jury verdict to determine if 
the evidence is "inherently improbable." If that standard is 
applied to this case, the evidence against Mr. Cantu can only be 
found to have been insufficient. The inconsistant, often-mistaken 
identifications of the defendant by the victim were the only 
evidence which linked Mr. Cantu to the crimes for which he was 
convicted. As noted in Appellant's Brief at 14-22, these 
misidentifications were insufficient evidence upon which to base a 
conviction. 
POINT III. 
(Reply to Respondent's Point IV.) 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING AN AIDING AND ABETTING 
INSTRUCTION WHEN THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF SUCH ACTIVITY. 
In his opening brief, the Appellant argued that the trial 
court erred in giving an aiding and abetting instruction because 
there was no evidence of such activity. The only evidence which 
placed the Appellant at the victim's home at the time of the assault 
was the victim's eyewitness identification. Therefore, according to 
the prosecution's theory, Mr. Cantu could only be found guilty of 
being a principal and not an aider or abettor. 
- 6 -
Respondent contends that the Appellant waived his right to 
object to the instruction because defense counsel did not state a 
reason for objecting to the instruction. In this case the entire 
defense rested on the fact that although that Defendant had been in 
the victim's home earlier in the evening, he had left well before 
the assault occurred. Thus the basis for the objection was clear 
and consistent with the defense in general. 
Even if this Court finds that the objection which was made 
(T. 649) was not specific enough, this Court recognized that some 
instructional errors may still be reviewed to prevent manifest 
injustice. State v. Kazda, 545 P.2d 190 (Utah 1976). 
This is a case where an aiding and abetting instruction may 
have produced a "manifest injustice." In this case the only 
evidence placing the Appellant in the victim's home at the time of 
the assault was the eyewitness identification, by the victim. If 
the jury did not believe this identification it might still have 
convicted the Appellant due to this erroneous instruction. Since it 
is impossible to determine under which theory the jury convicted the 
Appellant, this erroneous instruction was manifestly unjust and may 
have led to a conviction unsupported by the evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
For any or all of the foregoing reasons, Appellant, Juan de 
Dios Cantu, asks this Court to reverse his convictions and remand 
his case to the District Court for a new trial, dismissal of the 
charges, or entry of conviction for Burglary, a second degree felony. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this C^Sj day of E^brUiu/, 1987. 
JO CKRQfL NESSET-SALE 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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